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IS TENDER OF PART PAYMENTS RECEIVED BY THE SELLER UNDER A
CONTRACT OF CONDITIONAL SALE A CONDITION PRECEDENT
TO THE MAINTENANCE OF REPLEVIN BY THE
SELLER AFTER DEFAULT BY THE BUYER.
In the recent case of Raymond Co. v. Kahn, 145 N. W., 164
(Minn.), it was held: that, in a so-called conditional sale, where
the seller retained title to the property and the right to recover it
on default of the buyer, it is not, in case of such default, a con-
dition precedent to the maintenance of replevin by the seller that
he return to the buyer partial payments made or notes given for
installments. (Whether partial payments made by the buyer are
forfeited in such case was left undecided.)
It is a general rule in the case of an ordinary contract of sale
that an election to sue on the contract upon breach is a waiver by
the seller of the right to rescind,' and likewise that a seller can-
not rescind the contract and retain the proceeds of the sale, but as
a condition precedent to rescission he must restore or offer to
restore that which he has received as consideration under the
1 Foster v. Smnith, 56 II1., 209; Kinney v. Kiernan, 49 N. Y., 164; Hart
v. Haight, 10 N. Y. Supp., 798; Tufts v. Weinfeld, 88 Wis., 647; Harrison
z. Ricketts, 63 L. J. Q. B., 647; 71 L T. Rep. (n, s.), 191.
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t.ontract.2 Also it may be noticed that mere default by he buyer
as to payment, after delivery of the goods, will not give the seller
a right to rescind,3 nor can he retake or replevy the goods.
i
In a so-called "conditional" sale (more accurately it is a con-
tract to sell, accompanied by a bailment of the goods, with a right
to retake them upon default by the buyer) we have a transaction
of a very different kind from a contract of sale. Title is reserved
in the seller,5 and there is a right to pursue the goods in specie
upon mere default.6 The seller then has a right of possession
and may retake the goods,7 or replevy them.8 The exercising of
this right by the seller has been held an election to rescind,9 and,
if so, held, he cannot thereafter sue for the purchase price."0
This is indeed true if there be rescission, as such, for all rights
under the contract are thereby terminated;:" yet it is evident that
the seller may also reclaim the property without rescinding the
contract but merely for the purpose of enhancing his security for
the purchase price.12 By so doing it may be that no rescission is
2 Wilcox v. San Jose Fruit Packjng Co., 113 Ala., 19; Miller v. Steen,
30 Cal., 402; Doane v. Lockwood, 115 II., 490; Thompson v. Peck, 115
Ind., 52; Milliken v. Skillings, 89 Me., 180; Sears v. Anes, 413; Smiith v.
Ryan, 191 N. Y., 452; see Willis on Sales, sec. 567; Mechen on Sales, p.
774.
3 Martindale v. Smith, 1 Q. B., 395; Buckingham v. Osborne. 44 Conn.,
133; Morse v. Chicago R. R., 73 Iowa, 226; Skinner v. Michigan Hoop Co.,
119 Mich., 412.
4 McNail v. Zeigler, 68 Ill., 224; McGraw v. Gilmore, 83 N. C., 162;
Dickens v. Winters, 169 Pa. St., 126.
5 Roberts v. Norton, 66 Conn., 1; Sinith v. Vaughn, 82 Ga., 574; Nich-
ols v. Ashton, 155 -Mass., 205; American Harrow Co. v. Deyo, 134 Mich.,
639.
6 Fields v. Williams, 91 Ala., 502; Van Allen v. Francis, 123 Cal., 474;
Barton v. Groesclose, 11 Ida., 227; Black Diamond Coal Co. v. The H. C.
Grady, 87 Fed., 232.
'Davis v. Millings, 141 Ala., 378; Griflin v. Ferris, 76 Conn., 221; Pels
v. Miller, 192 Mass., 13; Roach v. Curtis, 115 N. Y. App. Div., 765; Seanor
v. McLaughlin, 165 Pa. St., 150; Segrist v. Crabtree, 131 U. S., 287.
sLambert v. McCloud, 63 Cal., 162; Frisch v. Wells, 200 Mass., 129;
Buffkins v. Eason, 112 N. C., 162; Scotch Mfg. Co. v. Carr, 53 Fla., 480.
9 Lamond v. Duvall, 9 Q. B., 1030; Dowdell v. Empire Fur. Co., 84
Ala., 316; Tufts v. Brace, 103 Wis., 341; Perkins v. Gobbem, 116 Mich., 122.
' 0 Loomis v. Bragg, 50 Conn., 228; Turk v. Carnahan, 125 Ind. App.,
125; Edmead v. Anderson, 118 N. Y. App. Div., 309.
21 See Mechem on Sales, p. 504.
12 Willis on Sales, pp. 962 ff.; Miller v. Steen, supra; Tufts v. D'Ar-
cainbal, 85 Mich., 185; Latham v. Summer, 89 Ill., 233; White v. Gray's
Sons, 96 N. Y. App. Div., 154; Ames v. Moir, 130 Ill., 582.
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accomplished. The seller simply enforces a right specifically re-
served to him under the contract. How can he be said to re-
scind the contract when he is acting under-it? The agreement is
still in force. The buyer may still obtain the goods by paying the
price. There is only this difference in the situation: before the
seller became repossessed of the goods, he had, after default, a
right of action plus a right to retake, now he has a right of action
plus a right to foreclose what is in reality a mortgage on the
goods. Now it would seem clear in such a case that the part pay-
ments need not be tendered back, for if the seller still has a right
of action for the contract price, he must of necessity be entitled
to keep that part of the contract price which he has received, at
least, until he has obtained satisfaction in one way or another.
The Courts, however, differ on this question greatly. If there
be true recission it would seem a hardship, all rights under the
contract being gone,13 that the vendee should forfeit his payments,
as in a case ";here he had paid $90 on a chattel of an agreed val-
uation of $100.
Again, if the seller is required to tender all payments back he
will have no compensation for the use of the property. However
this may be, even in the case of reclamation there is also con-
flict. Many jurisdictions regard the payments as forfeited.14 and
there is consequently no need of tender. 5 Others take the oppo-
site view and consider tender of part payments an absolute condi-
tion precedent to the maintenance of replevin.' s
Certain cases frequently cited to support this latter holding are
clearly distinguishable. For instance, in Soda Fountain Co. v.
Drug Co. 17 the seller himself was in default. Shafer v. Russell18
13 Madison R. R. Co. v. Osler, 39 Mont., 245.
14Fields v. Williams, supra; Hayes v. Temple, 198 Mass., 372; Latham
v. Sumner, supra; Ryan v. Wayson, 108 Mich., 519; Hughes v. Kelly, 40
Conn., 148; Lorain Steel Co. v. Norfolk St. Ry. Co., 167 Mass., 500; White
v. Oakes, 88 Me., 367; Tufts v. D'Arcambali supra; Duke v. Shackelford,
56 Miss., 552; Angier v. Mfg. Co., 1 Gray, 621; Haynes v. Hart, 42 Barb.,
58; Morgan v. Kidder, 55 Vt., 367; Kirby v. Thompkins, 48 Ark., 273.
15 Latham v. Sumner, supra; Wall v. Demitkiewicz, 9 App. Cas. D. C.,
109; Nat'l Cash Reg. Co. v. Ferguson, 25 Misc., 363.
16 Commercial Co. v. Campbell Co., 111 Ga., 388; Puffer v. Lucas, 112
N. C., 377, Spyer v. Baker, 59 Ohio St., 11; Preston v. Whitney, 23 Mich.,
260; Hamilton v. Singer Mfg. Co., 54 Ill., 371; Segrist v. Crabtree, supra.
'L 136 Iowa, 312.
1828 Utah, 444.
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simply held that the payments were not forfeited but said nothing
about tender as a condition precedent to replevin. Hine v. Rob-
erts decided that goods given in part payment were forefited
but held that the seller, having reclaimed his property, could not
thereafter sue on a note previously given him.
It may also be noticed that in Segrist v. Crabtree,
20 the leading
case in opposition to the majority rule, the opinion cites no cases
in support of the view therein advanced and dismisses the matter
in a few words.
In Latham v. Davis2 the Court evidently treated the contract
as rescinded though the seller only reclaimed.
The hardship of forfeiture has led some Courts to declare that
where the seller has reclaimed there is failure of consideration,
and part payments may be recovered back with a fair 'deduction
for compensation for the use of the property.
22 This, even, is
distinctly unfair to the seller, for, as has been shown, he is en-
titled to have the contract treated as still in esse, and recover
the contract price; in which case the goods will become the
property of the buyer.
Yet another view is assumed in some few states, and this, it is
submitted, is the correct one. There it is held, in accord with the
principal case, that whether payments be regarded as forfeited
or not and irrespective of whether the buyer may have a right, if
the seller is otherwise satisfied, to recover them in the future, that
tender is no condition precedent. to retaking the goods or to the
maintenance of replevin .
2
On principle the buyer in a conditional sale, though he never
receives the goods through his own default, has got all he was
promised, that is, a conditional right, and were it not for the fact
that equity abhors a forfeiture he would most certainly be de-
prived of his part payments.
24
This equitable principle, however, should not be used to strip
the seller of his security. "The transaction" (a conditional sale)
says a learned author, "is in its essence a chattel mortgage by the
19 48 Conn., 267.
20 Supra.
2144 Fed., 862.
22 Hill v. Townsend, 91 Ala., 286; Pierce v. Staub, 78 Conn., 359;
Lathain v. Sumner, supra (semble).
28 Fleck v. Warner, 29 Kans., 492; Thirlbey v. Rainbow, 93 Mich., 164.
24 Williston on Sales, p. 952, note.
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buyer on the purchased property to secure the price. Just as the
mortgagee may sue for the proceeds and also foreclose his mort-
gage on the property,25 so the seller in a conditional sale should
be allowed to sue for the price and also reclaim the property, not
as his own, but for the purpose of foreclosing it * * * * Of
course, as in the case of a mortgage, the seller should be restricted
to satisfaction of his claim with interest * * * * Any ex-
cess over the amount due should be returned to the buyer. ' 26
Then why not treat a conditional sale as a chattel mortgage?
The technical difficulty that title has never passed to the buyer is
easily removed by a sinfple fiction, which does no more violence
to the logic than those of equitable conversion or of lost grants
in prescription. By this means justice will be done. The buyer
is not prejudiced. He may sell the property subject to the mort-
gage27 eveh after default 28 or he may redeem by paying the price.
On the other hand the seller is protected. If he recovers on the
contract, well and good, for then the property will be the buyer's.
If he forecloses, the excess over the mortgage debt with interest
will be returned to the buyer and the debt itself satisfied 29 and
if no return be made an action will lie to compel the mortgagee to
account.80
This view is necessarily conclusive as to the question of tender
of part payments in replevin. The seller is entitled to his every
lawful security. The fact that he has an action on the contract
against a probably insolvent buyer would be small consolation to
a seller who had been compelled to refund part payments lawfully
received under that contract. It is submitted that the view of the
principal case is correct.
CAN A- TESTATOR'S ESTATE BE HELD LIABLE FOR A LIBEL CONTAINED
IN HIS WILL?
In Harris v. Nashville Trust Company, decided recently by the
Supreme Court of Tennessee, it was held that an action could be
25 See Toney v. Cook, 116 Mass., 163; Erickson v. Rafferty, 79 Ill., 209.
26 Williston on Sales, p. 952, note.
27 Wilkins v. French, 20 Me., 111; Bigelow v. Willson, 1 Pick., 485;
Russel v. Ely, 2 Black. (U. S.), 575.
28 Paidling v. Barron, 32 Ala., 9.
29 Colorado Bank v. Wilson, 16 Colo., 316; Hoff-man zv. Wetherell, 42
Iowa, 89; Korns v. Shaffer, 27 Md., 83.
30 McClendon v. Wells, 20 S. C., 514; Reese v. Lyon, 20 S. C., 17.
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maintained against an executor as such for damages from a libel
contained in a will and published by its probate. The declaration
avers that Mrs. Cleo Woodfin Harris was niece of the testator
Woodfin and that the latter with malice and the intention of de-
faming her character and that of her children, added a codicil to
his will containing the following language: "and this sum of
$250.00 to John Woodfin, $1.00 to William Woodfin, and $1.00 to
Cleo Woodfin, the illegitimate children of my brother, James
Woodfin, is all that they are ever to have of my estate." Plain-
tiff avers that she is the legitimate child of her parents and prays
judgment of $20,000 for the damage resulting to her from the
publication of this codicil. Defendant, executor of Woodfin, de-
murred. The Court treats the proposition as a novel one and
cites no authority directly in point: neither have we been able to
find a case in which this question has before arisen, but on gen-
eral principles of law we have reached a result opposite to that
of the Court.
"Actio personalis moritur cur persona" is a maxim of the
common law-a personal action dies with the person. We
agree that this maxim has no application to the present
case, for here no right of action ever eisted in the lifetime
of the testator. An essential element of a libel is the publi-
cation-the will locked in the testator's desk or stored in "his
bank vault was not injurious to the plaintiff's reputation-and no
action for damages could lie until publicati6n. 1 The publication
complained of is the probate of the will which was required by
law, 2 and which occurred after the testator's death. The tort
having arisen or been completed only after the testator's death, it
could not have died with him; it is not within the maxim. If
Mrs. Harris is to recover, is not the Court confronted with the
question-can a dead man commit a tort? Can one without life
be guilty of blaspheming another's good name? They answer
these questions in the affirmative; is there any sound law with
which to substantiate such a conclusion?
The Court held that the executor was the agent of his testa-
tor,-"the publication of this libel was made by the agent, the
1 Weirs v. Hass, 6 Ala., 881; She ffll v. VanDeusen, 13 Gray, 304;
Broderick v. James, 3 Daly, 481; McGreever v. Kennedy, 19 Ky. Law Rep.,
845.
2 Shannon's Code, sec. 5665; Smith v. Harrison, 2 Heisk, 230; Douglas
v. Baber, 15 Lea, 651.
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executor, in literal pursuance of the authority given; i. e., it was
made by the probate of testator's will. It was the duty of course
of the executor to probate this will, etc. etc." This ground is un-
tenable for at least two reasons.
In the first place it is abhorrent to the very nature of the exec-
utor's legal status. He is a trustee of the estate, an officer of the
Probate Court and responsible to it. It is true that the will
named him as executor but that amounted to a mere nomination
to the Probate Court, which appointed him and from which un-
der the modern English and American decisions he received
plenary authority over the estate.3 He holds the legal title to the
property himself; he acts for himself as principal and is responsi-
ble to the Court on his own account. His duties, rights, and obli-
gations are wholly incompatible with the theory of agency.
Secondly, it is inconceivable that there can be an agency when
no principal is in existence; surely the Court can't mean that he
was acting for the deceased Woodfin, and yet that is the ground
on which they base their decision. It is absurd to say the testator
appointed him after the latter's death, so he must have been ap-
pointed during the life of Woodfin with the agency to go into
effect only upon the death of the testator. This construction is
more favorable to the Court than any other, and yet this is clearly
erroneous, for death of the principal revokes the agency in every
case except two: first, when the agency is coupled with an inter-
est in the subject matter ;4 and second, when the revocation would
involve the agent in liability to third parties.
5 Certainly the exec-
utor's "agency" to probate this will was coupled with no interest
in the subject matter, nor would a revocation of the "agency"
have rendered him liable to any third parties. His obligation to
probate it grew out of no contractual relation with his testator,
but it was a duty imposed by law upon the person named as exec-
utor.
However, admitting for the sake of argument that the execu-
tor is an agent, it does not relieve the situation, for still an execu-
tor, whether agent or principal, can only be held for the
3 BIakely v. Frazier, 20 S. C., 144; Stagg v. Green, 47 Mo., 500; Tappan
v. Tappan, 30 N. Y., 50.
4 Hunt v. Rousmaniers Advist., 8 Wheaton, 174; Frank v. Roe, 70 Cal.,
296.
Goodwin v. Bowden, 54 Me., 424.
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debts owed by the testator at his death." Also admitting for the
same purpose that the tort complained of could be considered a
debt, which of course it could not, still the Court's theory is em-
barrassed fiecause they insist the tort was never committed until
after death and probate; and "no action can be sustained against
an executor or. administrator as such * * * * when the
complaint imputes a tort done to the persons or goods of another
by testator or intestate."7 Thus the executor's liability does not
extend to torts of the testator whatever may be the theory of the
latter's legal status. This argument of course assumes that the
Court would quite readily agree to the proposition that the act of
the agent is the act of the principal."
The case is a hard one. Mrs. Harris has been greviously
wronged by the testator's false statements, and* as a matter of
justice sle was entitled to redress. It was probably sympathy
that led the Court to the conclusion they reached; having found
no principle of law able to sustain their position, they created one.
It may be best that they did so, but there are some results of such
a rule that may well be noted.
Woodfin's will disposed of his property completely, and the
will takes effect as of the time of the testator's death. 9 Thus the
legacies of A., B., and C. upon probate of the will vest in them as
of the date of the death of the testator, and they are deemed to
have been owners between the time of decease and the time of
probate. The action for libel rises only upon the probate in this
case, so that to allow recovery would result in A., B., and C. pay-
ing for the tort of Woodfin. It is true the legacy must be ac-
cepted before it takes effect, but the law presumes its aceptance
until the contrary is shown, when the devise is beneficial. 10 The
testator has passed beyond the jurisdiction of the Court and any
liability cast upon his estate that did not exist at his death is not
a liability upon the testator nor his property, but a liability im-
posed upon those whom he has seen fit to favor.
6Eustace v. Johns, 38 Cal., 3, p. 23; 2 Williams on Executors, pp.
1470-1.
7 Eustace v. Johns, 38 Cal., 3; 2 Williams on Executors, p. 1478.
8 4 Harvard Law Review, 347.
9 Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U. S., 627; Groves v. Mitchell, 90 Wis., 306.
" OMerrill v. Emery, 10 Pick., 507; Ex parte Fuller, 2 Story, 327;
Defreeze v. Lake, 109 Mich., 415; Perry v. Hale, 44 N. H., 363; Rogers v.
Farrar, 6 T. B. Mon. (Ky.), 421.
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Another objection to permitting any recovery in this case is
that it gives Mrs. Harris a right of action founded upon an act
required by law. The statute of Tennessee not only made it the
duty of the executor to probate this will, but it provided for crim-
inal prosecution if he failed to do so. It is a universal principle
of law that no tort can be predicated upon an act which is re-
quired by law for in legal contemplation there can be no wrong
if the act complained of is legal ;: and here the very basis of Mrs.
Harris' claim was the injury caused by the publication through
probate of the will-an act required by statute.
12
One more result of such a rule as is laid down by the Tennes-
see Court should be noticed. Suppose a statute of the state made
it against public policy for one to devise property to certain
classes of persons-for instance to a woman with whom the
testator had lived but to whom he was not lawfully married. Un-
questionably she could take nothing under his will, even though
the testator made her his sole legatee. Now, knowing that he
could not bequeath any of his property to this woman, but being
desirous that she have a portion of his estate, what would the tes-
tator do? He could insert a clause in his will calling her a "thief,
liar, imbecile," or impute to her any other characteristic which
was false and libellous per se. Could she not then take from his
estate by means of an action of tort for the libel, and this too in
the face of the statute prohibiting her from being a legatee?
We cannot agree with the Court's decision, for we believe it is
based on unsound law; neither are we able to find any branch
of the law that will .support their conclusion. Furthermore, we
submit that it is at least a debatable question whether the Legisla-
ture should enact a law allowing a recovery for a libel contained
in a will. Would not a better remedy for an abuse of this kind
be for the Court to suppress the libellous words by striking them
from the probate record?
STATUTES UNENFORCEABLE EXTRA-TERRITORIALLY BECAUSE PENAL.
It is a general rule of international law that one country or
state will not give effect to the penal statutes of another.' Courts
11 Cooley on Torts, second ed., p. 830.
12 Shannon's Code, sec. 6565.
1 The Antelope, 10 Wheat. (U. S.), 66.
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are unanimous in their views in this respect. There has, how-
ever, been no such universal agreement among the Courts as to
just what statutes are penal within the meaning of this rule. A
great deal of the existing contrariety of opinion seems to have
resulted from a failure to appreciate the fact that penal in munic-
ipal law has a different meaning from that given it in interna-
tional law when it is said that penal statutes have no extra-terri-
torial operation.
For example, Massachusetts now has a statute which allows
the recovery, in case of wrongful death, of a sum "not less thari
$500 nor more than $10,000," to be assessed with reference to the
degree of the defendant's culpability. It is provided that such
sum may be recovered either by indictment or by an action
Lrought by the executor, one-half of which sum, however recov-
ered, is to be paid to the widow, and the other to the children of
the deceased. 2 Some Courts have refused to enforce rights con-
ferred by this statute because they considered it penal.
3 Statutes
of a similar character in other states, providing for the recov-
ery of a lump sum, have likewise been held to be penal.
4 In other
jurisdictions, -however, the Courts have considered such statutes
as primarialy remedial and have given effect to them.
5 State
Courts in construing their own statutes have frequently held such
statutes, as well as statutes giving double or treble damages, to
be primarily remedial. 6 In Massachusetts, when a statute was
in force like the present statute, except that a recovery in tort
was not providd for, an indictment was held to be bad because
there was neither widow nor children surviving.
7
The different meanings of the term penal have been recognized
by eminent authorities. 8 The Supreme Court of the United
2 Acts and Resolves 1907, chapter 375.
3 Ada-ms v. Fitchburg Railrogd, 67 Vt., 76, 30 AUt., 637; O'Reilly v.
Railroad Co., 16 R. I., 338, 17 Ati., 906; Christilly v. Warner (Conn.), 88
Atl., 71.
4 Raisor v. C. & A. Railroad Company, 117 Ill. App., 488; Matheson v.
Railroad Company, 61 Kan., 667; Dale v. Railroad Company, 57 Kan., 601.
5 Boston & Maine Railroad Co..v. Hurd, 108 Fed. R., 116;Malloy v.
American Hide and Leather Co., 148 Fed. R,, 482; Hill v. Boston & Maine
Railroad Co. (N. H.).
6 State v. Railway, 58 Me., 176; State v. Railroad, 52 N. H., 548; Phil-
pott v. Railroad, 85 Mo., 164; Quimby v. Woodbury, 63 N. H., 370; Brady
v. Daly, 175 U. S., 147.
7 Commonwealth v. B. & A. Railroad Co., 121 Mass., 36.
8 Dicey, Conflict of Laws, p. 207; Minor, Conflict of Laws, sec. 10.
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States, in Wisconsin v. The Pelican Insurance Co.,' pointed out
in a general way the statutes considered as penal in international
law: "The rule that the Courts of no country execute the penal
laws of another applies not only to prosecutions and sentences for
crimes and misdemeanors, but to all suits in favor of the state
for the recovery of pecuniary penalties for any violation of stat-
utes for the protection of its revenue, or other, municipal laws,
and to all judgments for such penalties. If this were not so, all
that would be necessary to give ubiquitious effect to a penal law
would be to put the claim into the form of a judgment." The
leading case on this subjec, however, is Huntington v. Attrill,2
decided by the same Court in 1892. A judgment had been recov-
ered against an officer of a New York corporation who had vio-
lated a statute of that state which made the officers of a corpora-
tion who signed and recorded false certificates of the amount of
its capital stock liable for all its debt. An action was then
brought on this judgment in Maryland, whose Courts refused to
enforce it because they considered the statute on which it was
based to be penal in its nature. 1 On appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, taken under the "full faith and credit clause" of
the Federal Constitution, the Maryland Court was reversed, it
being held that the statute of New York was remedial rather than
penal. The Court points out the difference between violations
of civil rights and criminal wrongs and holds that only those
statutes which seek to punish offenses "against the public justice
of the state" are penal in the international sense, and disentitled
to extra-territorial operation. Those statutes which only confer
a right on an individual -to a civil action as a result of a wrongful
act were held to be remedial and enforceable in other states and
countries. The decision in this case was followed the next year
by a decision by the Privy Council in a case where the same facts
were involved. 12 These decisions would class as remedial all
those statutes which gave a remedy where none existed before,
allowing only a recovery for damages actually sustained, and also
those which gave a right of action but did not limit the recovery
to the damages actually sustained, as where damages in a lump
sum are given or where the damages awarded according to the
9 127 U. S., 165, 290.
10 Hutington v. Attrill, 146 U. S., 657.
11Attrill v. Huntington, 70 Md., 191, 16 AtI., 651.
12Attrill v. Huntinqton (1893), App. Cases, 150.
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culpability of the defendant, provided always that the primary
purpose of the statute was to confer a civil remedy rather than
punish an offense against the state. It is submitted that these
cases announce the sound rule.
When a state is asked to enforce a statute of another state,
claimed to be penal, how shall it proceed? Obviously, the first
question to be dealt with is whether the statute is penal in the
international sense. Is such Court bound by constructions placed
on the statute by Courts of the state where it was enacted? It
has been held that it is not.13 The Connecticut Court in a recent
case, Beach, J., dissenting, held that it was bound in such a case.1 4
The result of this decision is that Connecticut Courts may have
to give effect to statutes of other states which are in fact penal
because those other states have construed them to be remedial
and because it is bound by their construction. It seems obvious
that a court should not consider itself so bound, because rarely,
if ever, would a State Court, in construing its own statute, be
called upon to decide whether such statute is penal in the inter-
national sense. Only questions of municipal law would be de-
cided by it. A decision that a statute is penal in the sense that it
must be strictly construed, or that it punishes incidentally, would
of course not mean that it is penal in the international sense, and
a Court of another state should not feel bound by such a decis-
ion. 5
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in Hill v. Boston &
Maine Railroad Co., supra, was called upon to enforce rights con-
ferred by the Massachusetts statute, which, in a similar case,
Christilly v. Warner, supra, had recently been denied in Connec-
ticut. In accordance with the views expressed by Beach, J., in
his dissent in that case, the New Hampshire Court allowed the
action. The decision is undoubtedly sound and adverse criticism
of it could only rest on grounds extermely technical.
Since the principles of international law are based on princi-
ples of international comity, and since Courts, in enforcing them,
proceed upon broad lines of justice, it is submitted that technical-
ities should not be allowed to prevail. If a statute, like the one
in force in Massachusetts, where no part of the recovery inures
1" Marshall v. Wabash Railroad Co., 46 Fed. R., 269.
14 Christilly v. Warner, supra.
35 Steam Engine Co. v. Hubbard, 101 U. S., 188, 192; Chase v. Curtis,
113 U. S., 452; Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 113 U. S., 452.
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to the benefit of the state, and where the action may be prosecuted
independently of the state authorities, and in which the rules of
civil rather than criminal law prevail, and where everything in-
dicates that the principal purpose of the act was to provide for
those dependent upon the dead man, is to be construed to be penal
because it incidentally punishes the wrongdoer, such a construc-
tion is most technical. It is based on form rather than sub-
stance and has little to commend it. The decision in the New
Hampshire Court is sound and should be followed.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS MATTER OF LAW.
In the recent case of Hatch v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., de-
cided by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New
York, there was some conflict in the evidence relating to the care
exercised by the deceased.' The following facts, however, were
undisputed:
The plaintiff's intestate, Hatch, together with the principal
witness, Nelson, started to cross a grade crossing on defendant's
line about 1:30 A. M. The gates were lowered, according to the
defendant's case, before the two had gone upon the tracks; ac-
cording to the plaintiff's case, however, Hatch and Nelson were
already upon the first siding, and inside the gates when they were
lowered, but were still in a place of safety. At least four more
tracks, therefore, were now- before them; first, another siding,
then the west bound and east bound tracks of the main line, in
the order named, and finally, still another siding. A freight
train was approaching along the further, or east bound track.
They waited until the caboose had almost reached the crossing,
and then started on. Nelson testified that at this point they both
looked eastward along the nearer track, where the Twentieth
Century Limited was now approaching, but saw nothing of it.
There was evidence, controverted by the defendant, tending to
show that the headlight of this train was dim or entirely extin-
guished, and that there was no warning bell or whistle. Plain-
tiff's intestate was killed by the express on the near track, as he
stepped ahead to pass behind the freight. On this evidence, the
questions of negligence on the part of defendant and contributory
negligence on the part of Hatch having both been left to the
1 145 N. Y. Supp., 781.
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jury, they twice returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the Ap-
pellate Division of the Supreme Court twice reversed the judg-
ments entered on these verdicts, on the ground that the trial
Court had refused to charge that a pedestrian who proceeds to
cross a track after the gates are down, whether they are lowered
before he starts, or while he is inside but still in a place of safety,
is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
It is obvious that the Appellate Division desired to lay down an
inflexible standard of reasonable human conduct. It may be
worth while to inquire whether it was justified in so doing, on
grounds either of authority or of reason. Mr. Wigmore, in his
"Treatise on Evidence," lays down three eceptions to the general
doctrine that the question of negligence is one of fact for the
jury.2
1. A concrete rule of law, statute or common, may have been
laid down, declaring certain acts, the dangerous consequences of
which are well known, to be negligent per se. One does them at
his peril. So a city ordinance might declare, or a Court might
decide, that one who left his horse unhitched in a city street should
be liable for the consequences at all events.
2. In every case, the Court must decide whether there is suf-
ficient evidence to go to the jury, so this question forms an ex-
ception as a matter of course.
3. In cases where "the facts are undisputed, and fair-minded
or reasonable men could draw but one inference from them,"
Courts, using these exact words, have often held that the con-
sideration of negligence may be withdrawn from the jury.
Mr. Wigmore's first and third exceptions are also stated ifn
somewhat different words in Cyc., and his second of course goes
without saying." If we examine his propositions closely, it ap-
pears that the concrete rule of law mentioned in the first excep-
tion must necessarily be the result, either of legislation, with
which we are not dealing here, or of the repeated exercise, in
numerous similar situations, of the discretion which his third ex-
ception allows the Court. That is, another inflexible standard of
reasonable human conduct has been embedded in the law. We
may therefore confine ourselves to the second and third excep-
tions. As Mr. Wigmore points out, the form of words used in
the third is often only another way of expressing the idea con-
2 Vol. 4, sec. 2552.
8 29 Cyc., 645 (tit. Negilgence).
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tained in the second. But equally often it means much more.
Many Courts, in applying this rule, have not confined themselves
to passing on the sufficiency of the evidence, but have gone fur-
ther, and constituted themselves judges of the fact; that is, of the
inferences and conclusions to be drawn from the evidence. There
are plenty of instances of similar encroachments on the province
of the jury, some of which will be mentioned later. Before we
inquire whether this particular invasion is justifiable or not, it
will be desirable to examine a few cases, taken at random from
among the numerous decisions on this point, which illustrate the
distinction drawn above. In none of these cases are the facts on
all fours with the principal case, but their tendency is fairly
obvious.
In California it has been held, in accord with the principal
case, that the act of a plaintiff in driving across the track when
he knew the train was very near, was contributory negligence.
per se.4 Yet the Court says:
"If one sensible and impartial man might decide that the plain-
tiff had exercised ordinary care, and another that he had not, *
* * * it must be left to the jury." From this it seems possible
that they may have intended to pass merely on the sufficiency of
the evidence. The Supreme Court of the United States, in de-
ciding the other way on a state of facts somewhat similar to those
in the principal case, uses practically the same expression:
"If fair-minded men will honestly draw different conclusions
from the same undisputed facts, then it is for-the jury."'
The -Illinois case of Terre Haute & R. R. R. Co. v. Voelkner is
directly in conflict with the principal case, as far as the spirit of
the opinion is concerned." It is there held that it cannot safely
be laid as a rule of law that one who goes upon a railroad
track without looking or listening for approaching trains, is
guilty of contributory negligence. Part of the opinion is well
worth quoting:
"It is doubtless a rule of law that a person approaching a rail-
way crossing is bound, in so doing, to exercise such care, caution
and circumspection to foresee danger and avoid injury as ordi-
nary prudence would require, having in view all the known dan-
gers of the situation, but precisely what such requirements would
4 Herbert v. R. R. Co., 121 Cal., 227.
5 Richmond & D. RIR. Co. v. Powers, 149 U. S., 43.
6 129 Ill., 540.
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be, must manifestly differ with the every-varying circumstances
unider which such approach may be made."
It is interesting to find two decisions of the highest Court of
New York, which also cast some doubt on the holding of the
principal case. In the case of Holbrook v. Utica etc R. R. Co.,
where there was some evience that the plaintiff's elbow was pro-
jecting outside the window of the car when the injury occurred,
the judge simply told the jury that if they found it as a fact they
might infer negligence from it.7 And in the case of Stackus v.
N. Y. C. & H. R. R. C., it was held that plaintiff's failure to
lower his buggy top at the railroad crossing was not negligence
per se.8 The Court uses language very similar to that quoted
above in the Illinois case:
"It is well settled that a person approaching a railroad crossing
must exercise care and caution such as a prudent person would
exercise to avoid danger. Whether such care has been exercised
in a given case, is usually a question of fact for the jury, to be
determined from all the circumstances of the case."
Other cases in substantial conflict with the principal case,
where the Court has limited itself to passing on the sufficiency of
the evidence, are to be found in Texas,9 Iowa,10 Maine," Ne-
braska, 12 and Wisconsin. 3
Other cases in substantial accord with the principal case where
the Court has attempted to lay down an inflexible standard of rea-
sonable human conduct, are to be found in Indiana, 4 and Penn-
sylvania.'5 Thus we find the issue squarely framed, and the au-
thorities in direct conflict. Ought the Courts of their own motion
to pick out certain acts and say that whoever does these shall be
negligent?
As a question of reason pure and simple, it is obvious that the
answer to it must depend on two considerations; first, what things
are for the Court, in general, and what things for the jury; sec-
ond, what manner of thing is negligence, and to which of these
712 N. Y., 236.
8 79 N. Y., 464.
9 T. & P. Ry. Co. v. Chapman, 57 Texas, 75.
10 Lavarenz v. C., R. I. & P. R. R. Co., 56 Iowa, 689.
i Phunier v. Eastern R. R. Co., 73 Me., 591.
2Spears v. Chi., B. & Q. R. R. Co., 43 Neb., 720.
1 Morrison v. Madison, 96 Wis., 452.
'4 Young v. Citizens' Street R. R. Co., 148 Ind., 54.
"t Boyle v. Mahoney City, 187 Pa., 1.
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two classes does it belong? Professor Thayer, in his essay on
"Law and Fact in Jury Trials," gives a clear-cut answer to the
first problem. 6 He says that the jury have come to be the judges
of a limited class of "ultimate facts," that is, facts which they
must derive from the evidence by reasoning, inference, and
judgment. Even here, however, they are subject to the super-
vision of the judges, who must pass upon the sufficiency of the
evidence. In a case of negligence, as the writer points out, this
would mean only that the Court had a right to determine whether
the conduct of the jury was reasonable in deciding whether the
conduct of a third party was reasonable. It is true that Courts
have always retained, and have even assumed from time to time,
jurisdiction over many matters of ultimate fact. But the wisdom
of these retentions and assumptions has been at least debatable.
For example, the Courts have always reserved to themselves the
interpretation of written instruments, and have laid down rigid
rules, whereby the intention of the maker has often been de-
feated, although his meaning would have been as clear as crystal
to twelve laymen. A still more glaring instance is found in the
definition of "legal insanity" laid down in MacNaghten's Case,
where it was held that insanity is an excuse for crime only where
the prisoner is mentally incapable of understanding the nature of
his act and its moral turpitude.' 7 The test was adopted univers-
ally, and is still widely followed in this country under the name
of "right and wrong" test. Yet it obviously does not cover many
cases of medical insanity, where the prisoner is not morally guilty.
The New Hampshire case of State v. Jones pointed out this in-
justice, and charged the jury generally that they were to acquit
the prisoner if they found that his act was the product of mental
disease.' s These cases clearly show the danger of laying down
an inflexible definition or rule of law in matters involving com-
plex facts an infinite variety of circumstance.
And it is equally clear that negligence, as well as insanity, is
such a matter, for it involves an average of human prudence un-
der an infinite variety of circumstance. It hardly seems wise for
one man to attempt to strike this average, even for a given set of
facts, but when he, or any number of men, go further, and say
that the average which they have struck under these present facts
16 4 Harv. Law Rev., 147.
3. 10 Clark & F., 200.
18 50 N. H., 369,
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shall apply to all future facts which are more or less similar, then
indeed we have an unprecedented invasion of the province of the
jury. For these reasons, it would seem that the line of decisions,
of which the principal case is one of the latest, represent a dan-
gerous tendency, and are wrong on principle.
A MUNICIPALITY AS A PUBLIC UTILITY.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, two justices dissenting, re-
cently held that the City of Menasha, having a population of
nearly six thousand, which in addition to lighting its streets, pub-
lic buildings, etc., with its own plant, merely furnished lights for
about two years to the mayor and the mayor's partner, and for a
few days to a third party, was not a public utility. It was
the intention of the city when erecting its plant to light the whole
town, but its plant proved wholly insufficient to do commercial
lighting other than that mentioned, and for over three years prior
to the commencement of the action in the case under discussion
it failed to furnish any light except for its own purposes. The
action was instituted for the purpose of restraining the city from
furnishing light to its citizens after the enlargement of its plant
subsequent to the passage of a statute requiring a municipality to
obtain the approval of the Board of Railroad Commissioners be-
fore entering into competition with an existing public utility.'
The Court stated in arriving at the above conclusion: "The
furnishing of a few lights to one store and one residence for a
short time we do not think made the city a public utility under the
doctrine of Cawker v. Meyer.2  However this might be, the
city had ceased to perform any function as a public utility for
more than three years before the passage of the * * * *
act." The dissenting opinion takes issue with these statements,
saying: "It is uncontroverted that the defendant city took all
the legal steps necessary to establish its right and power to build
a lighting plant to supply the city and the inhabitants thereof with
light * * * * I think the city lost no rights which it had ac-
quired * * * * by delaying to extend its activities to com-
mercial lighting * * * * It did not if a city has the same
1 Wisconsin Traction, Light, Heat & Power Co. v. City of Menasha,
145 N. W. Rep., 231.
2 147 Wis., 320.
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rights * * * * as corporations organized for private gain
have." Wright v. Milwaukee Elec. R. & L. Co.' and Calumet
Service Co. v. Chilton4 are relied upon, the opinion in the latter
case being quoted, as follows: "Excusable, temporary suspen-
sions, involving no purpose to abandon, the owner being willing
and seasonably, under the circumstances, able to resume and do-
ing so as in this case satisfies the calls for a 'public utility.'
* * * *,'
In the case of Cawker v. Meyer, it was held that a building
owner did not, by furnishing heat, light and power to his own
tenant and selling the surplus to three neighbors, become a pub-
lic utility. Quoting the opinion of the Court in that case: "It was
not the furnishing of heat, light, or power to tenants, or, inci-
dentally, to a few neighbors, that the Legislature sought to regu-
late, but the furnishing of these commodities to the public; that
is, to vhoever might require the same.5 The use to which the
plant, equipment, or some portion thereof is put must be for the
public, in order to constitute it a public utility.
"But whether or not the use is for the public does not neces-
sarily depend upon the number of consumers; for there may be
only one, and yet the use be for the public; as where a plant is
built and operated for furnishing power to the public generally,
but for a time finds one consumer who uses it all. If the product
of the plant is intended for, and open to the use of, all the mem-
bers of the public who may require it, to the extent of its capac-
ity, the fact that only one or two thereof consume the entire
product renders the plant none the less a public utility."
It would have been difficult for the Court to have more defi-
nitely anticipated the case before us and we are led to disagree
with the majority on the proposition that the city was not a public
untility within the doctrine of the case quoted. Having once be-
come a public utility, the city became entitled to all the rights and
subject to all the liabilities that would attach at common law were
it a private corporation or a natural person.6 Its right to conduct
the lighting plant under the permissive power in its charter, when
once exercised, became a property right of which the Legislature
3 95 Wis., 29.
4148 Wis., 334.
5 Wisconsin v. Pier, 137 Wis., 325.
6 Bullnaster v. St. Joseph, 70 Mo. App., 60; Abbott on Municipal Cor-
porations, §892; Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 4th ed., §66.
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could not divest it ;7 and subject to the limitation by statutory and
constitutional provisions of the power of a public corporation to
incur indebtedness, it was bound to exercise the privileges
granted and could not abandon the franchise without the consent
of the public.8 - It happened that no effort was made to compel
the city to furnish its citizens with light, and because of the in-
capacity of its plant it shut down, but without abandoning its
purpose. The question is whether by so doing it ceased to be a
public utility, and we do not believe that it did under the doctrine
of Wright v. Milwaukee Elec. R. & L. Co., cited in the dissent-
ing opinion but not mentioned in the opinion of the Court. In
that case it was held that the non-user of a street railway fran-
chise for more than four years in a period of industrial depres-
sion and financial difficulties on the part of its owners, during
which the street was paved at the expense of the adjoining prop-
erty owners and the old track taken up when practically worth-
less, with the consent of the company, but the electric poles and
wire were left in place, did not constitute such an abandonment
or non-user as to raise a presumption of the surrender of the
franchise where it was always the intention to resume operation
as soon as the financial atmosphere cleared.
If a private or quasi-public corporation would not have lost its
franchise under the circumstances of the case at hand, it cannot
be said that a public corporation acting in its private or proprie-
tary character lost analogus rights. Though the case was a close
one, it would seem that the doctrine of the minority is the better
one.
7 People v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y., 1; Dillon on Municipal Corporations,
4th ed., §§68, 68a, 69.
8 Abbott on Municipal Corporations, §894; Wyman on Public Service
Corporations, §305.
